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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILFORD N. HANSEN and VADA J. 
HANSEN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
Supreme Court No. 19383 
vs. 
JOHN J. STEWART and ALICE E.K. 
STEWART, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF APPELLANTS 
WILFORD N. HANSEN and VADA J. HANSEN 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Wilford and Vada 
Hansen, the Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully petition the Utah Supreme Court for 
rehearing of the above-entitled matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioners set forth, with particularity, the following points of facts and law 
which Petitioners claim the Court has overlooked or misapprehended. 
1. While the location of a disputed boundary may often be a question of 
both fact and law, in this case, there are only questions of law. None of the facts 
are in dispute. The majority's description of appropriate roles of judge and jury 
presupposes a determination that there are factual issues to be resolved by a jury and 
that some evidence has been presented in support thereof. In the instant case, there 
are no disputes of relevant factual issues. The only issue involves the application of 
law to the undisputed facts. 
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2. The facts do not support the verdict, factually or legally. The facts 
presented support only one conclusion: judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. If the facts 
presented in this matter are clearly understood and are distinguished from the opinions 
and conclusions proffered by the witnesses at trial, the Court will understand that 
there is not even a scintilla of relevant factual evidence which supports Defendants' 
i 
position. What is in dispute in this case is the law. 
3. Plaintiffs' appeal does not ask the Court to ignore its standards of review. 
Plaintiffs have now comlied with the Court's standards of review. Since the jurors 
i 
had no factual issues to weigh, the appellate court's determination will not be a 
substitution for the decision of the jury. Because the facts do not support the verdict, 
it cannot stand. 
4. Even if Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions and their specific objections 
made in chambers have not been preserved in the record, the Court may still, in its 
discretion and in the interest of justice, review errors in instructions which have not 
i 
been properly preserved. Special circumstances warranting such a review occur in this 
case because the jury instructions are legally insufficient and result in prejudice to the 
plaintiff. 
< 
a. The jury was asked to resolve an alleged factual dispute when there 
was none. 
b. The jury was instructed to weigh evidence which, by law, had already 
< 
been weighed. 
c. The jury was instructed to determine the credibility of witnesses 
when credibility was not a relevant issue of fact. Since there were no factual 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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disputes, this instruction resulted in their weighing the credibility of the witnesses' 
arguments, opinions, and conclusions. 
d. The burden of proof should have rested with defendants. 
e. Plaintiffs and surrounding landowners are now burdened by a void 
judgment. The judgment is void because, despite disclaimers of the trial judge, it 
assumes jurisdiction over landowners who are not parties to this action, and will 
require that they reform their deeds. 
5. Plaintiffs resubmit with this petition a marshalling of all the evidence. 
None of it is in dispute and none of it supports the verdict as a matter of law. The 
Supreme Court is entitled to overturn the jury verdict and enter judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiffs as a matter of law i.e., to grant judgment notwithstanding the jury 
verdict, or to order a new trial when there is manifest error or when the verdict is 
not supported by substantial evidence, is against law, or is void. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. THIS TRIAL PRESENTED ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW. 
The majority opinion issued on July 28, 1988 states (See par. 6): 
The determination of the actual location of a disputed 
boundary is often a compound issue which presents question 
both of law and of fact. . . In any particular case, then, 
where conflicting evidence of various types is presented, 
some evidentiary conflicts may be resolved as matters of 
law, while others may be decided as matters of fact. The 
appropriate roles of judge and jury are preserved when the 
judge instructs as the relative weight to be given each type 
of evidence and the jury then determines the facts to which 
those relative weights are to be assigned. See 12 Am. Jur. 
2d Boundaries Section 116 (1964). 
Although it may have been proper to empanel a jury at the beginning of this trial in 
case there were to be disputes of fact presented, there were no conflicts that needed 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to be resolved as matters of fact. The facts in this case consisted of undisputed 
testimony regarding the visible location of boundary lines and fences, the undisputed 
and unambiguous descriptions in the deeds of landowners in Lot 12, field measurements 
which can be shown to be in agreement to within a few inches, various unofficial maps 
and plats which were offered to show undisputed relative positions of various 
properties, and the scaled dimensions derived therefrom.1 (See marshalled evidence in 
appendix.) 
75 Am. Jr. 2d Trial Section 328 states: 
Before submitting a case to the jury, the judge must 
determine whether the party who has the burden of proof 
has produced any substantial evidence upon which the iurv 
can properly render a verdict in favor of that party. 
Having found that such evidence has been introduced, the 
court cannot invade the function of the jury to determine 
the facts, but must, when such evidence is conflicting, or 
admits of different inferences, leave the case to the 
determination of the jury. 
In the instant case, the issue of the corner location was raised as part of defendants' 
counterclaims. The defendants, therefore, have the burden of proof. The trial judge 
should properly have determined 1) whether there was any substantial evidence upon 
which the jury could properly render a verdict in defendants' favor, and 2) whether 
such evidence was in dispute. It should be remembered that "evidence" refers 
exclusively to the facts and not to the opinions and conclusions presented at trial. 
Such opinions, conclusions etc. may become confused with evidence in a juror's mind, 
1
 By way of note on this point, it was difficult at trial to see that the 
measurements were not in dispute because Defendants' surveyor conducted his 
measurements irregularly, ie. to points within the Block not recommended by good 
surveying technique, so that his measurements must at times be added together to show 
that his measurements agree with Plaintiffs' surveyors' measurements. 
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but are not in themselves probative as factual issues. Whether there are factual 
questions may not be readily apparent at the beginning of trial, and may not be readily 
apparent even at the close of the trial, as in this case. The fact that counsel or trial 
judge may neglect to follow these determinations need not imply that factual issues 
exist and support defendants' claims. If neither counsel nor the judge recognized that 
there were no factual issues at trial, it constitutes manifest error to assume or to 
determine erroneously that some must have existed. The principal trial question itself 
which was submitted to the jury cannot itself be a factual issue if the underlying facts 
are not at issue. There were no issues of fact. This being the case, this Court may 
review the facts and so determine. 
In the present case there are several reasons why the trial judge and the 
opposing counsel (See Defendants' Brief at p.4) have passed over this argument without 
reciting any fact which they claim was at issue. 
a. The evidence was technical. 
b. The surveyors' measurements were taken from different points and 
need to be understood mathematically to recognize that they agree with each other to 
within inches. 
c. The testimony of the witnesses was fraught with statements of 
opinion about what the law on this question might reasonably be, and with unfounded 
conclusions so that even though the underlying facts were in agreement, the testimony 
appeared to be divergent and contradictory. 
In spite of the trial court's reluctance to review the facts after trial and in 
spite of Defendants' counsel's implications to the contrary in Defendants' Brief, the 
truth of the matter is that there is no issue of fact. 
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The majority assumes that conflicting testimony necessarily implies conflicting 
facts. Testimony consists of relevant and irrelevant facts, founded and unfounded 
conclusions or opinions. The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Rather, 
the witnesses' conclusions and opinions were in dispute. 
POINT II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. THE FACTS 
PRESENTED SUPPORT ONLY ONE CONCLUSION - PLAINTIFFS' POSITION. 
Whether or not there were issues of fact presented at trial, the relevant facts 
support only one conclusion, the position claimed by Plaintiffs. In the present case, if 
the testimony is reviewed carefully to separate the relevant facts from the claimed 
conclusions, (a task that is sometimes difficult during the trial itself) it can be clearly 
seen that there is not one scintilla of evidence to support Defendants' position. All of 
the facts are in harmony and are supportive of only one position: locating the
 { 
northeast corner of Lot 12 at a coincident point with the northeast corner of Block 34 
- Plaintiffs' location. All of the boundaries, deeds, maps, plats and measurements are 
in agreement. Not even the boundary between Plaintiffs and Defendants is factually at { 
issue. Both parties stipulated that the only issue was the actual location of the 
northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34. Plaintiffs marshalled all of the factual evidence 
(see appendix) and have searched the record for a factual issue or for a fact which { 
can be viewed in a light supportive of Defendants' position and have found none. Only 
testimony such as the following is seen (see Trans Vol III p. 99-100) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. JENKINS: < 
Q Mr. Hickman, I think your experience in surveying and abstracting stands 
probably 40 years, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q In your experience and based upon your training do you have an opinion 
as to what the impact would be, and I want a comparison, of using the Bott survey to 4 
establish the northeast corner of Lot 12 as opposed to the Spires' survey? 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A I would like to go into a little background. I'm concerned personally 
about the impact of this whole trial because in my opinion it strikes right at the heart 
of the American recording system which was established by William Bradford who was 
the first governor of the Plymouth Colony who set up a recording system so that 
documents could be put of record to establish for the public as a whole notice of 
interest so that they could go there and determine the status of ownership of property. 
If we at will change recorded maps and this type of thing, it seems to 
me that there is going to be a great deal of impact, and now I'm getting to your 
question. 
What is to prevent us from changing any survey, any subdivision that is 
recorded today through use, I'm not stating that ownership or possession cannot 
change, because I don't deny that and it can be. What I'm saying is that the recorded 
information should be there as a reference. 
Now, it's a simple matter to change descriptions on individual deeds. We 
do it everyday and the cost is minimal. 
The thing that I don't like to see is a change of this nature because it 
does not only affect this particular piece, but just in Logan and Hyrum and so forth 
alone there are many, many blocks where this same thing has happened and this could 
set a precedent for creating impact on those as well as this one. 
Q What does the Bott survey do? 
A Well, in my opinion all the Bott survey does is show the location of the 
record and the possessory interest. 
Q What does the Spires' survey do? 
A It attempts to change that record location. 
Q Will the Bott survey adversely affect the ownership of property within 
Lot 12? Are those people down the line going to be hurt? 
A Obviously it will, the two parcels involved here, but no, I can't see that 
it will the others. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FILLMORE: 
Q The fact is other parties will be affected unless they agree to a 
reformation of deeds, right? 
A Right. 
The court committed reversible error when it allowed the 
court appointed surveyor and another surveyor who had 
surveyed the land in question to state their opinions as to 
the true boundary line between plaintiff and each of the 
defendants. . . . 
Combs v. Woodie 53 NC App 789, 281 SE2d 705 (1981) 
In the present case, it is clear that Defendants' object is to reject the 
beginning point in spite of its clear harmony with all of the other relevant facts. 
Defendants' statement (Transcript Vol 3 at p.33) that if their position is allowed to 
7 
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stand, all of the deeds in the area will have to be reformed, is a clear statement of 
their error. It amounts to saying, "The facts as they now stand are in favor of 
Plaintiffs survey point, and if Defendants' position is accepted, all of the facts will 
have to be reformed to support it.H 
As stated in 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 55 (1974): 
In locating and running the boundary lines of lots or tracts 
of land of private owners, reference is to be had to the 
calls in the grant and to the field notes carried into the 
grant or the map or plan with reference to which the 
conveyance was made; and if there is no ambiguity the 
land must be located and the lines run according to the 
description of the conveyance. None of the calls should be 
rejected or disregarded if thev can be harmonized and 
applied in any reasonable manner...the real purpose of a 
boundary inquiry is to follow the steps of the surveyor on 
the ground, and all calls will be construed with this in 
mind. 
In short, there is not one scintilla of evidence, and not any fact in dispute, 
which supports the location of the disputed corner at the location contended for by 
Defendants. It never has existed there, and would require the reformation of all of 
the facts to put it where Defendants contend. 
POINT III. PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL DOES NOT ASK THE COURT TO 
IGNORE ITS STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Plaintiffs' appeal accepts the standards of review established by the court for 
examining jury instructions, for overturning a jury verdict, for granting a new trial or 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as shown in the sections below. Plaintiffs have 
now complied with each of those standards. 
8 
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POINT IV. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT THE COURTS REVIEW 
OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
The majority in this matter, citing Rule 51 U.R.C.P., E.A. STROUT WESTERN 
REALTY AGENCY, INC. v. W.C.FOY & SONS, INC., 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983) and 
CAMBELT INT'L CORP. v. DALTON, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987), have stated 
Rule 51 does allow this Court Min its discretion and in the 
interests of justice" to review errors in instructions which 
have not been properly preserved. However, "it is 
incumbent upon the aggrieved party to present a persuasive 
reason" for exercising that discretion, and this requires 
"showing special circumstances warranting such a review." 
The Strout case then suggests (p.1323) that special circumstances include those 
instances where the court's instructions presented to the jury are legally insufficient 
or result in prejudice to the party seeking relief. As set forth in STATE v. KAZDA 
545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976) there must also be a showing that there is a "substantial 
likelihood that an injustice has resulted." 
The majority in this matter states that Hansens have made no such showing. 
However, Hansens clearly show that the jury instructions given are legally insufficient, 
result in prejudice to them, and that injustice has occurred as follows: 
A. The jury was asked to resolve an alleged factual dispute when there was 
none. POWERS v. GENE'S BLDG MATERIALS, INC., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977) held: 
Parties are entitled to have their theories of the case 
presented to the jury in the form of instructions only if 
they are supported by the evidence. 
B. The jury was instructed to weigh evidence which, by law, had already been 
weighed. 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 61 states: 
In surveying a tract of land according to a former plat or 
survey, the surveyor's only duty is to relocate, upon the 
best evidence obtainable, the courses and lines at the same 
9 
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place where originally located bv the first surveyor on the 
ground...the rule is based on the premise that the stability 
of boundary lines is more important than minor inaccuracies 
or mistakes...A resurvey not shown to have been based upon 
the original survey is inconclusive in determining boundaries 
and will ordinarily yield to a resurvey based upon known 
monuments and boundaries of the original survey. 
12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Sections 64 through 66 state: 
All parts of the description in a conveyance should be 
allowed to stand if possible, and none of the calls should be 
rejected if thev can be applied in any reasonable manner: it 
is only in the case of an obvious mistake or where there is 
such a contradiction or inconsistency as to render the 
conveyance unintelligible that some of the calls are to be 
rejected. 
The general rule that in the construction of boundaries the 
intention of the parties is the controlling consideration is 
applied in determining the relative importance of conflicting 
elements of description. The various rules adapted by the 
court for construing and interpreting conflicts between calls 
of description all have for their primary purpose the 
ascertainment of the intention of the parties. Another basic 
consideration is that those particulars of the description 
which are uncertain and more liable to error and mistake 
must be governed bv those which are more certain. 
Where the calls for the location of boundaries to land- are 
inconsistent, other things being equal, resort is to be had 
first to natural objects or landmarks, next to artificial 
monuments, then to adjacent boundaries (which are 
considered a sort of monument), and thereafter to courses 
and distances... 
In determining boundaries of a tract of land, it is not 
permissible to disregard any of the calls if they can be 
applied and harmonized in any reasonable manner, but if 
there is an actual contradiction between calls in the 
description of land, so that they are irreconcilable, the 
court mav reject or disregard the one which is false or 
mistaken. Calls which cannot be complied with because they 
are vague or repugnant may be rejected or controlled by 
other material calls which are consistent and certain. An 
inconsistent call should be discarded if thereby all the rest 
of the calls are reconciled and the description perfected. 
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12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 71 p. 608 states: 
Ancient fences used by a surveyor in his attempt to 
reproduce an old survey are strong evidence of the location 
of the original lines and, if they have been standing for 
many years, should be taken as indicating such lines as 
against the evidence of a survey which ignores such fences 
and is based upon an assumed starting point. It is said that 
a long-established fence is better evidence of actual 
boundaries settled bv practical location than any survey 
made after the monuments of the original survey have 
disappeared. Accordingly, a fence erected on a surveyed 
line shortly after the land has been surveyed may serve as a 
monument to control courses and distances or a subsequent 
survey after the stakes set out at the time of the original 
survey have disappeared. 
The weight of the relevant facts presented in this survey case is 
determined by law. Therefore it is not within the discretion of a jury to weigh it. 
C. The jury was instructed to determine the credibility of witnesses when 
credibility was not a relevant issue of fact. Since there were no factual disputes, this 
instruction resulted in their weighing the credibility of the witnesses' arguments, 
opinions, and conclusions. 
Witness credibility was not at issue because the present location of all of the 
boundary lines and fences was agreed upon, the deeds were clear and unambiguous and 
were for the trial court to interpret, and the measurements agreed with each other. 
The trial courts' instruction to the jury that they were the determiners of the 
credibility of the witnesses was misleading and could only have resulted in a jury 
decision based upon the witnesses' conclusions and opinions. 
D. The burden of proof should have rested with defendants. The disputed 
corner was the issue raised by defendants as an issue in support of their counter-
claim. 
11 
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E. Plaintiffs and surrounding landowners are now burdened by a void 
judgment. The judgment is void because, despite disclaimers of the trial judge, it 
assumes jurisdiction over landowners who are not parties to this action, and will 
require that they reform their deeds. The dissenting opinion correctly points out that 
if the defendants' contention is adopted as to the location 
of the obliterated monument, all property owners along 
Sixth East Street must shift south 33 feet. Since this would 
put boundary lines through existing houses, both parties 
agree that this is not practical and that instead the 
description of each property owner would have to be 
reformed to conform to the defendants' contention as to the 
location of the corner. 
This reformation affects the numerous property owners in Block 34, only two of which 
are parties to this action. The rendering of a judgment which affects these property 
owners without obtaining jurisdiction over them renders the judgment void. 
Where the final decree in an action between adjoining 
landowners to establish the true boundary between their lots 
incorporated a new survey which established that the entire 
section contained excess acreage, that the parcels belonging 
to the parties should be apportioned on a pro rated basis, 
and that a road through the center of the subdivision was 
75 feet off of its actual true center line, the effect of the 
enlargement of the section would be to redraw the 
boundaries of each and every lot in the subdivision as well 
as those of all parcels outside the subdivision but within the 
section. All owners of affected lots and the citv. as holder 
of an interest in the public roadway, would be indispensable 
parties and the rendering of a final judgment without 
jurisdiction over such parties would render the judgment 
void and such jurisdiction failure would not be cured bv an 
express declaration in the decree that the court had no 
intent to adjudicate the rights of those not parties to the 
action. 
Johnston v. White-Spunner 342 So2d 754 (Ala 1977) 
12 
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POINT V. THE SUPREME COURT IS ENTITLED TO OVERTURN THE JURY 
VERDICT AND ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR TO ORDER A 
NEW TRIAL. 
The Court may overturn, grant judgment, or order a new trial where there is 
manifest error or when the verdict is not supported by substantial evidence, is against 
law, and is void. The majority in this matter holds that: 
Therefore, an insufficiency-of-the-evidence based challenge 
to a denial of either motion (j.n.o.v. or a new trial) is 
governed by one standard of review: we reverse only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party who prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. 
The majority then summarily states, as did the trial judge and opposing counsel without 
reference to a single specific fact in dispute, that: 
During the three-day trial, each side supported its position 
with deeds, maps, plats, and the testimony of several expert 
surveyors who had independently retraced the original 
surveys of the disputed parcels. The Hansens did not object 
to the admission of any of the material evidence. There 
were conflicts in the evidence...On the record, before us, we 
cannot conclude that the evidence was so slight and 
insubstantial that it cannot support the verdict for the 
Stewarts. 
The sufficiency of the evidence and whether there was any material issue have been 
previously discussed. (See POINT I.) 
But a new trial may also be granted even if the evidence 
was sufficient to support the verdict, when the judge 
believes the verdict was against the clear weight of the 
evidence; or when procedural errors were committed (such 
as erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, misconduct 
of a party or counsel, etc.) which in the trial judge's 
estimation may have seriously contaminated the proceeding. 
(JAMES & HAZARD, Civil Procedure, Sections 7.20, .22(3d ed. 1985)) 
13 
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12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries Section 116 states: 
New trials may be granted in cases involving questions of 
the location of boundary lines where the questions are legal 
in their character; and in proper cases new trial will be 
granted on grounds dependent upon the weight of the 
evidence. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the verdict itself results in manifest error. If, as 
Respondents contend, the very facts themselves (the deeds) would have to be reformed 
if the verdict were to stand, it is clear that the verdict is wrong. Indeed, if all deeds 
are reformed to refer to the new point defendants have located, the disputed boundary 
should still be resolved in Plaintiffs' favor as the single boundary in question is not 
ambiguous in the deeds. And since the intent of such reformation is to not alter the 
lines of possession which have agreed with the deeds, the boundary Plaintiffs defend 
would remain as they contend. Judgment in favor of defendants would result in chaos 
and would not even resolve the disputed boundary. Judgment in favor of plaintiffs 
easily resolves all issues of law, alters no facts, and injures no one. 
CONCLUSIONS 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Petitioners respectfully request that the Court 
determine 1) that there have been no questions of fact presented in this matter, 2) 
that there is no evidence either factual or legal to support the verdict, 3) Plaintiffs 
have now complied with the Court's standard of review, 4) the jury instruction's were 
legally insufficient and resulted in prejudice to plaintiffs, and 5) that plaintiffs should 
be granted a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of Aijgjjst, 1 9 ^ ^ -
tfllTL HANSEN -
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS 
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CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
BILL HANSEN, being first duly sworn, upon his oath certifies as follows: 
1. I am counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter. 
2. The Petition for Rehearing attached hereto is presented in good faith and 
not for any delay. 
DATED this 11th day of August, 1988. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of August, 1988. 
Residing at: j ^u^e^\ 
My commission expires: (^ ^ ^ (# - Oy> 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Evelyn Herbert, being first duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of WILFORD N. HANSEN JR., attorney for the 
P l a i n t i f f s / A p p e l l a n t s herein; that she served the attached 
Ppt.ition for Rehearing
 ; 
.upon 
the n p f P t i r t a n t s / R p s n o n d f l n t s by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: James C. J e n k i n s 
Jpnkins fe Eurbank 
67 Fast. IPO North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
_and 
deposited the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereof, in the United 
States mail at Payson, Utah on the H t h day of Augus t
 t 1988. 
Zoe^^AAiAir 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this H t h day of Augus t 
1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Payson, Utah. 
My commission expires November 20, 1988. 
^^nn^^r 
IOTARY PUBLIC S 
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MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE 
1. The figure is a drawing to scale (1 inch - 165 ft.) of important features near 
the disputed boundary located in Lot 12 Block 34. When various features have a 
number near them, place in a circle, e.g. 6, the number refers to a note given 
below. The abbreviation "cf." is used to indicate a cross-reference and "Ex." 
followed by a number indicates a specific exhibit. "Trans. I, II or III" is the 
abbreviation for trial transcript, volume I, II or III, as they are respectively 
referenced herein. 
2. Southeast corner of Lot 12 Block 34. The location on the ground of the 
Southeast Corner of Lot 12 was agreed to by all parties. 
3. The Northeast Corner of Lot 17 Block 8 was the next point north on the 
ground that could easily be identified with a point on the Martineau plat. It 
was the south boundary of a paved street. Its use was not objected to by 
anyone. 
4. The distance from the Northeast corner of Lot 17 south to the north boundary 
of a graveled lane called 800 South street is about 1350 feet by measurement (cf. 
Trans. Vol. Ill p. 81 lines 1-4). The distance from the Southeast Corner of Lot 
12 to the south boundary of the same lane is also about 1350 feet. The 
Martineau Plat calls for these distances to be equal, by showing them to be the 
same length on the plat drawing. Thus the placement of the present 33 ft. wide 
800 South street distributes the excess land equitably on both sides. This fact is 
evident on the large aerial photograph (cf. Ex. 5). 
5. The location of this point with respect to both the Northeast Corner of Lot 12 
and the Southeast Corner of Lot 12 is called for in two different deeds (cf. Ex. 
15, 17). These deeds therefore specify the length of Lot 12. The length 
specified is 400 ft. + 950.5 ft. « 1350.5 ft, in close agreement with Plaintiff's 
Northeast Corner of Lot 12 location (cf. Trans. I p. 82 lines 8-12). 
6. The location of this point by measurement is 934 feet south of the Plaintiff's 
Northeast Corner of Lot 12 (cf. Trans. Vol. Ill pp. 94, 95). Four deeds call for 
this same distance (cf. Exs. 10 or 11, 13, 17, 22). This is a driveway of 1 rod 
width, easily identified on the ground. 
7. The land at issue in this trial is shown by the cross-hatched area. It is north 
of the fence whose position at the time of trial is roughly indicated by the line 
with little tick marks. 
The fence location might require a little explanation to avoid confusion. In 
1969 when Hansen acquired his property from Miller there was no boundary 
fence on roughly the west half of the disputed property, as testified by Hansen 
( cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 35 lines 11-13). Stewart testified that there was a fence, 
in poor condition (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 76 lines 2-9). Stewart caused the angular 
fence present on the east side to be extended in a straight line to the west 
boundary line in about 1977. Spiers surveyed the area in December 1978 while 
the straight fence was up (cf. Ex. 7). Hansen had the fence taken down, and 
after that Stewart had it put up again, but as indicated in the drawinc with it* 
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west end going to the North. Litigation was started and has taken several 
years. Meanwhile, the fence has remained as indicated on the figure. 
8. The rectangular strip of land (40 ft. by 330 ft.) was deeded by Allen to Miller 
before Allen deeded the parcel north of this strip to Stewart. The Allen to 
Miller conveyance was by two deeds, on in 1957 and one in 1960 (cf. Exs. 14, 
18). Here the location of the strip is derived from Plaintiff's Northeast Corner 
of Lot 12 location. 
9. Location of the "Northeast Corner of Lot 12 Block 34 Plat A Providence Farm 
Survey" as contended by Plaintiffs. 
10. Location of the "Northeast Corner of Lot 12 Block 34 Plat A Providence Farm 
Survey" as contended by Defendants. 
11. The position of this 10 ft. strip of land on the ground is obvious. Its 
description in deed (cf. Exs. 10 or 11) calls for the "Northeast Corner of Lot 12 
Block 34" as its own Northeast Corner. 
12. The points marked by X are the sites of steel surveyor's pegs testified to by 
Hansen (cf. Trans. Vol HI p. 3 lines 6-18). Their location is perfectly consistent 
with Plaintiff's Northeast Corner. 
13. The deed calls for all the remaining parcels of land in Lot 12 are also 
consistent with measurements in the field if the Northeast Corner of Lot 12 is 
located as the Plaintiff's contend (cf. Trans. Vol. Ill pp. 66-67 and the exhibited 
deeds). 
14. The transparent overlay to the figure shows the positions of the boundaries in 
Lot 12 as called for in the deeds using the Defendant's Northeast Corner of Lot 
12. The resulting entanglement is obvious. Lots outside Lot 12 are also 
involved. If the area labeled 8 is shifted south as on the overlay it will be in 
Hansen's pond. 
15. Note that there is no sign of the big platted 800 South street cast of 600 East 
street, on the ground, even though it is prominent on the Martineau plat (cf. Ex. 
5). The area that the street would occupy is already occupied by a large 
church. 
16. cf. Trans. Vol. HI pp. 94, 95. 
17. cf. Trans. Vol HI p. 81 line 3. 
18. Stewart pasture (cf. Ex. 9). 
19. Hansen property (cf. Exs, 10, 11). 
20. Thayne properties (recently purchased by Larsen, cf. Exs. 16, 23). 
21. Gunnel property (cf. Ex. 17). 
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22. Former Gunnel property (cf. Ex. 22). 
23. Plaintiffs purchased the disputed property (cf. map 7, 8) which adjoins 
Defendants* property on the south from Maurine Miller (cf. Ex. 10 or 11), who 
acquired the property from her husband Charles' estate. Charles Miller acquired 
the property from Albern Allen by two separate Warranty Deeds in 1957 and 1960 
(cf. Ex. 14, 18). Charles Miller acquired additional property (cf. map 19), 
adjoining the two parcels, on the south and cast from Vernon Kreasie and Amy 
Kreasie in 1956 and 1958 (cf. Ex. 13, 15, 19). Vernon Kreasie acquired the 
property from John William Kreasie in 1943 (cf. Ex. 12). 
24. Defendants purchased their pasture (cf. map 18) from Albern Allen in 1967 (cf. 
Exs. 9, 21). 
25. Charles Miller deeded lots to Henry Thain (cf. Exs. 16, 20, map 20) and J.B. 
Gunnel (cf. Ex. 17, map 21). 
26. J.B. Gunnel deeded land in Lot 12 to Plaintiffs in 1970 (cf. Ex. 22, map 22). 
27. Robert Larsen acquired the two Thain lots (cf. map 20) in 1983 (cf. Ex. 23). 
The 10-foot strip belonging to Plaintiffs and located north of the Thain lots is 
now being used by Larsen and its northeast corner is fenced. The northeast 
corner of that fence was referred to at trial as the Larsen fence corner and is 
at the northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34 as Plaintiffs claim (cf. Trans. Vol. I 
p. 41 lines 2-10, also map northeast corner of Lot 12). 
28. Two of the deeds arc double-tied to both the northeast corner of Lot 12, 
Block 34 and the southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34, to-wit: Kreasie to 
Miller, Miller to Gunnel (cf. Exs. 15, 17). These deeds specify the length of Lot 
12 as 1350.5 feet, in close agreement with the location of the northeast corner 
of Lot 12, Block 34 as Plaintiffs claim (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 53 lines 4-10 error 
on lien 10 should read 1350.5 feet and Trans. Vol. Ill p. 94 lines 13-16). This 
measurement is confirmed by Spiers, Naylor and Bott (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 82 
lines 8-22, Trans. Vol. II p. 53 lines 4-10 and Trans. Vol. II p. 122 lines 20-25). 
29. At the time Plaintiffs purchased their property, they discovered that the fence 
along what Defendants claimed to be their southern boundary did not run in an 
east/west direction as described in Plaintiffs' and Defendants' deeds (cf. Exs. 10, 
11, 9, map 7), and was at the time only partially completed. It was later 
completed in a line to the southwest (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 35 lines 11-13 and 
Trans. Vol. II p. 80. line 12, p. 81 line 7) at an angle and encroached from 16 
feet at its eastern-most point to 25 feet at its western-most point into 
Plaintiffs' property. Defendants recently move the wets half of the fence in a 
northwesterly direction to the point claimed by Plaintiffs to be the northwest 
corner of the western-most Allen-to-Miller parcel (cf. Ex. 14 or 18, map 8 
northwest corner of parcel). 
30. Plaintiff Wilford Hansen and the then-Cache County Surveyor, Erwin Moser, 
surveyed the property and located the actual boundaries described in the deeds 
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and the northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Farms at the 
point now claimed by Plaintiffs, the Larsen fence corner (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 19 
line 12 and p. 20 line 16). 
31. Plaintiff Wilford Hansen contacted Defendant John Stewart, who refused to 
adjust the encroaching fence line and claimed that the fence was the actual 
boundary (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 82, lines 9-13). Plaintiffs filed this action to 
quiet title to their property. 
32. Plaintiffs has the property resurveyed by Ken Spiers, a registered land 
surveyor employed by Forsgren and Perkins (cf. Ex. 7) and by Clyde Naylor, 
Utah County Surveyor and President of the Utah Chapter of the National Society 
of Professional Engineers (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 5 lines 11-23 and Trans. Vol. II p. 
6 lines 2-11). Both surveys show the northeast corner of Lot 12 Block 34 to be 
at the point claimed by Plaintiffs, the Larsen fence corner (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 
41 line 17, p. 42 line 3 and Trans. Vol. II p. 8 lines 13-24). Both surveys show 
that the lines of possession in Block 34 conform with the record titles, that is 
deed descriptions, (including Defendants9 except for their southern boundary) in 
Block 34 only if the northeast corner of Lot 12 Block 34 is at the Larsen fence 
corner as Plaintiffs claim (cf. Trans. Vol. HI p. 66 lines 10-15, line 23, p. 67 line 
o. 
33. Defendants employed Randy Bott, a seminary teacher and part-time surveyor, 
to resurvey the property (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 103 line 10 pc 106 line 5 and 
Trans. Vol. II p. 107 lines 12-18). Bott determined that there were two corners: 
one he called the "northeast corner of Block 34 as possessed", and a second he 
called the "northeast corner of Lot 12 as measured" (cf. Trans. Vol. I p. 47 line 
23, p. 48 line 3). At trial, Bott testified that he found the first corner (located 
at the Larsen fence corner as Plaintiffs claimed) by noting the lines of 
possession established on the ground, using record title descriptions, 
measurements and other evidence (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 147 lines 2-7, p. 125 lines 
8-11). The second corner, 33 feet south of the first, he found by measuring the 
length of the east line of Lot 12 indicated on the Martineau Plat, multiplying 
the number of inches by the scale (number of inches x feet per inch • 1320 
feet) (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 120 lines 20-21, p. 121 lines 4-6). Then, beginning at 
the south line of Lot 12, assuming the actual north/south distance of Lot 12 to 
be 1320 feet, Bott located the "north line of Lot 12 as platted", by measuring 
1320 feet along the east boundary of Lot 12 (cf. Ex. 8, Trans. Vol. II p. 122 line 
24, p. 123 line 2, p. 125 lines 5-6, p. 126 line 21). He proclaimed the northern-
most point of said line to be the northeast corner of Lot 12 as platted (cf. 
Trans. Vol. II p. 126 lines 21, 24-25). 
34. Naylor's uncontroverted testimony was that the measured distance from the 
only two identifiable monuments that exist in the area along the west side of 
600 East street (the monuments at the southeast corner of Lot 12 and at the 
south boundary of 600 South street) was 2, 733 feet, rather than the distance of 
2, 706 feet suggested by the scale of the Martineau Plat (cf. Ex. 1, Trans. Vol. 
Ill p. 80 line 17, p. 81 line 4). This shows that the Martineau Plat is not a 
survey and that the scaled dimensions of the Martineau Plat do not exist 
anvwhere on the ground (cf. Trans. Vol. HI o. 80 lines 11-17). 
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35. Hickman testified that the Martineau Plat was drawn primarily for tax 
assessment purposes (cf. Trans. Vol. Ill p. 31, line 23, p. 32 line 3). Bott, 
Naylor and Hickman testified that the Martineau Plat was created as an office 
survey or paper survey as were subsequent plats (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 135 lines 
19-24, Trans. Vol. HI p. 32 lines 4-12, Trans. Vol. Ill p. 55 lines 6-12). 
36. Bott, Naylor and Hickman testified that if the northeast corner of Lot 12 is 
located as Defendants claim, Plaintiffs', Defendants', Larsens* and other deeds 
tied to the northeast corner (north line) of Lot 12 (and by implication the deeds 
in the other lots of Block 34 in line with the north boundary of Lot 12) will of 
necessity need to be reformed and/or the long-standing lines of possession 
relocated (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 130 lines 1-6, Trans. Vol. II p. 36 line 3, p. 37 
line 20, Trans. Vol. Ill p. 67 line 17, p. 68 line 25, Trans. Vol. Ill p. 75 line 23, 
p. 76 line 22, Trans. Vol. HI p. 33 lines 4-20). 
37. It is undisputed that there is merely a partial gravel lane, approximately 33 
feet wide, beginning at 600 East street and extending westerly along the north 
boundary of Lots 12, 11, 10 and 9 at the location indicated as 800 South street 
on the Martineau Plat. There is not evidence that a 66-foot road has ever 
existed at that location (cf. Trans. Vol. II p. 44 lines 6-12, p. 10 lines 20-24). 
38. No evidence was presented that there has ever been any dispute over lines of 
possession or record titles in the area except along the disputed south boundary 
of Defendants pasture. Defendants now propose to disrupt the lines of 
possession and record titles (deed descriptions) of the entire area to establish 
the south boundary of their pasture as they claim, an unconscionable result (cf. 
Trans. Vol. II p. 38 lines 14-20). 
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